Network governance for large‐scale natural resource conservation and the challenge of capture by Bixler, R. P. et al.
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
Center of Urban Resilience Scholarship Center of Urban Resilience
1-1-2016
Network governance for large‐scale natural
resource conservation and the challenge of capture
R. P. Bixler
D. M. Wald
L. A. Ogden
K. M. Leong
Michele Romolini
Loyola Marymount University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center of Urban Resilience at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center of Urban Resilience Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Repository Citation
Bixler, R. P.; Wald, D. M.; Ogden, L. A.; Leong, K. M.; and Romolini, Michele, "Network governance for large‐scale natural resource
conservation and the challenge of capture" (2016). Center of Urban Resilience Scholarship. 9.
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cures_pub/9
Recommended Citation
Bixler, R. P., Wald, D. M., Ogden, L. A., Leong, K. M., Johnston, E. W., & Romolini, M. (2016). Network governance for large‐scale
natural resource conservation and the challenge of capture. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 14(3), 165-171.
165
I Stott et al. 
© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org
The stewardship of large- scale natural resource  systems for multiple purposes, such as water provision, wildlife 
protection, recreation, and agriculture, requires the appli-
cation of landscape- level decisions (Aycrigg et al. 2013), 
an understanding of ecosystem connectivity (Peters 2008), 
and the accommodation of multiple – and often competing 
– forms of land use (Parrott and Meyer 2012). Resource- 
based conservation efforts must consider the larger picture 
and develop landscape- scale strategies across regional and 
national boundaries (Locke 2011). Network governance 
has responded to this need by offering an approach to 
expand “collaborative conservation” into large- scale natu-
ral resource management contexts (Peters 2008; Leong 
et al. 2011; Locke 2011). As several articles in this Special 
Issue illustrate, network governance has emerged as a 
means of considering management across multiple geo-
graphic and temporal scales (see Panel 1 in Scarlett and 
McKinney 2016). For instance, as Bixler et al. (2016) 
describe, a network approach in Montana, Alberta, and 
British Columbia has provided opportunities for over 100 
governmental and non- governmental organizations to 
communicate and coordinate conservation efforts across 
private, state/provincial, and federal boundaries, as well as 
across the US–Canada border (see also Wyborn and Bixler 
2013; Jedd and Bixler 2015). However, as conservation 
initiatives have grown in scope, size, and scale, the unique 
challenges of scaling- up collaborative conservation efforts 
among a broader and more diverse base of participants, 
while at the same time managing their multiple and often 
competing interests, have become more acute. This paper 
examines a heretofore largely neglected barrier to network 
governance: that of how  different types of interest groups 
may capture this process.
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Large- scale natural resource conservation initiatives are increasingly adopting a network governance 
framework to respond to the ecological, social, and political challenges of contemporary environmental 
governance. A network approach offers new modes of management that allow resource managers and others 
to transcend a single institution, organization, resource, or landscape and engage in conservation that is 
multi- species and multi- jurisdictional. However, there are challenges to network governance in large- scale 
conservation efforts, which we address by focusing on how special interests can capture networks and shape 
the goals, objectives, and outcomes of initiatives. The term “network capture” is used here to describe an 
array of strategies that direct the processes and outcomes of large- scale initiatives in ways that advance a 
group’s positions, concerns, or economic interests. We outline how new stakeholders emerge from these 
management processes, and how the ease of information sharing can blur stakeholder positions and lead to 
 competing knowledge claims. We conclude by reasserting the benefits of network governance while 
acknowledging the unique challenges that networks present.
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In a nutshell:
• Successful network governance has the potential to improve 
environmental stewardship efforts by promoting inclusive 
and equitable partnerships
• The benefits of network governance, which include flexibil-
ity and inclusive participation, also present distinct 
 challenges, such as network capture, shifting stakeholder 
boundaries, and competing knowledge claims
• New stakeholders often emerge from the network govern-
ance process but often do not fit into traditional stakeholder 
categories or hold traditional positions
• Special interests can influence the governance process to 
maximize social, political, and economic benefits
• Strategies of network influence include corporate capture, 
philanthropic capture, and agency capture
Front Ecol Environ 2016; 14(3): 165–171,  doi: 10.1002/fee.1252
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Non- hierarchical network theory uses the term “appa-
ratus of capture” to describe the ways in which particular 
interests can capture and control the central logic gov-
erning socio–natural relationships (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987). We apply the rationale of apparatus of capture to 
extend the traditional notion of agency capture – mean-
ing the transfer of power in public- lands management to 
narrow special interests (Culhane 1981) – to newly 
emerging models of natural resource governance. Here, 
we use the term “capture” to describe the ways that spe-
cial interests can control the underlying dynamics, 
including shaping the processes and the objectives, of 
large- scale natural resource stewardship initiatives. By 
extension, we use the term “network capture” as short-
hand for an array of strategies that direct the outcomes of 
network governance efforts in ways that align with a par-
ticular group’s agenda, concerns, and economic or politi-
cal interests.
Several characteristics of networks make them vulnera-
ble to capture, as we demonstrate throughout this paper. 
First, technological advances in online and social media 
technologies have greatly enhanced the speed and effec-
tiveness with which information is spread through net-
works. This proliferation of information has increased the 
visibility of competing claims to environmental science 
and expertise. Second, the configuration and structure of 
participants in network governance are flexible over 
time, which allows networks to reorient as functions and 
goals change. In traditional multi- stakeholder processes, 
stakeholder interests and categories tend to be well 
defined to include representatives from resource agencies, 
private- sector interests, environmental organizations, 
and so forth (Decker et al. 1996), but stakeholder posi-
tions are becoming increasingly more fluid as the bound-
aries between government, special interests, and 
philanthropic efforts become distorted within contempo-
rary environmental policy and management contexts. 
Such boundaries tend to be clearly defined in more tradi-
tional processes, but in networks their imprecision creates 
opportunities for network capture to occur.
Here, we elaborate on the processes of network capture, 
and outline three different strategies that are used by spe-
cial interests. We then discuss particular challenges, 
including the “blurring” of stakeholder boundaries and 
positions, the ease of information sharing, and contested 
claims to technical expertise. We argue that these 
dynamics of network capture influence the processes and 
outcomes of governance, and should be balanced with 
the benefits of networks that are discussed elsewhere in 
this Special Issue.
 J Forms of capture
The idea of “capture” is not unique to network gov-
ernance; it has a long history in public land management 
policy and politics, with much of the literature focusing 
on the phenomenon of “agency capture” (Culhane 1981; 
Davidson and Frickel 2004). More recently, scholars 
have identified new forms of capture associated with 
neoliberal environmental politics (that is, governing 
nature through forms of commodification [Igoe and 
Brockington 2007]), as discussed below, which we 
 describe as “corporate” and “philanthropic” capture.
In the tradition of interest group theory, Culhane 
(1981) argued that mining, grazing, and timber groups 
control the flow of public goods, thereby transferring the 
power of agencies to narrow special interests. Capture, 
therefore, came to describe situations where organized 
interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals 
through government policy at the expense of the public 
interest. The term “agency capture” has been used to 
describe the ways in which industry constrains and 
 dictates regulatory outcomes (Shepard 1975). Agency 
capture also occurs when natural resource agencies are 
incapable of moving beyond traditional “command and 
control” forms of governance (Holling and Meffe 1996), 
given that agency partners, sometimes based on past 
experience, are often skeptical about the ability of com-
munity partners to manage natural resources. Despite 
agency efforts to shift toward more participatory 
approaches, many current US policies continue to pro-
mote the idea of the manager as being the primary  trustee 
and owner of a defined set of wildlife, land, and/or 
resources (Smith 2011). Agency culture tends to be 
 conservative and hierarchical (Briggs 2003).
Agency norms, perceptions, and policies often promote 
a single jurisdictional authority, a stance that leads to the 
delayed adoption of network initiatives and the exclusion 
of new and/or diverse network collaborators. This results 
in management strategies based on policies and norms 
that prevent operational shifts toward more collaborative 
approaches to governance (Leong et al. 2011), which is 
fundamental to network governance. Moreover, there are 
considerable benefits to retaining jurisdictional authority. 
The literature on US natural resource agencies suggests 
that, as with many bureaucracies, the most successful 
agencies (defined in terms of budgets, staffing, and public 
support) are those that stake out specific areas of expertise 
and defend them (Clarke and McCool 1996; Ogden 
2008). Defending boundaries of expertise leads to 
situations where agencies can capture, control, and guide 
the objectives of networks.
Scholars interested in hybrid forms of environmental 
governance (eg Lemos and Agrawal 2006), such as 
network governance, are particularly concerned by the 
potential of corporate capture in the context of neoliberal 
governance (Fletcher 2010). Neoliberal governance 
arrangements have increasingly transformed the landscape 
of environmental management around the world, through 
“private–public partnerships”, private protected areas, 
and other market- based resource management strategies 
and incentive programs (Heynen et al. 2007; Igoe 
and Brockington 2007). Market- based approaches, or 
what political scientists have called the “privatization 
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of governance”, include the corporate sponsorship of 
conservation initiatives, and a singular reliance upon 
ecotourism as a strategy for economic and ecological 
sustainability (see Igoe and Brockington 2007; Castree 
2010). For example, in the mid- 1990s, a network of 
grassroots ecotourism businesses, manatee- monitoring 
organizations, and conservation organizations developed 
in Gales Point Manatee, Belize, with the goal of spurring 
an ecotourism industry that supported local livelihoods. 
However, as the network evolved and reconfigured over 
the course of 6 years, local and non- local “elites” 
(individuals of superior status) inequitably accumulated 
tourism income and misappropriated international grant 
monies, which unintentionally instigated a privatized 
approach to tourism development (Belsky 1999).
By dismantling state- based regulations, neoliberal forms 
of governance set the stage for the growing popularity of 
network governance efforts. Both trends are reliant upon 
market- based incentives and the decentralization of state 
authority over the governance of nature (McCarthy 
2006). Cashore (2003) provided an analytic framework 
for understanding the ways that governing authority is 
captured by an array of non- governmental entities, such 
as global forest certification programs, which utilize mar-
ket incentives to remake social–ecological relations at a 
global scale (see also Cashore et al. 2004). Examples of 
market- based social change initiatives, such as Fair Trade 
coffee and Forest Stewardship Council certifications, 
offer strategies that harness market forces to pursue social 
and environmental objectives. However, a serious chal-
lenge for both certification schemes is to operate in the 
conventional market without undermining their original 
objectives. Case studies and research have illustrated 
that – despite its good intentions – the market’s conven-
tional logic, practices, and dominant actors capture 
 certification networks (Taylor 2005).
Corporate capture also occurs when the costs of 
environmental standards or environmental management 
are high as compared with the benefits of compliance or 
collaboration (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Given a lack of 
resources and the high costs of management, some  networks 
are vulnerable to capture by interests that can provide 
resources and, in so doing, the influence of  network 
members becomes diminished or is discarded completely. 
Some scholars see these trends as leading to “increasing 
democratic deficit and higher levels of inequality in the 
allocation of environmental resources” (Lemos and Agrawal 
2006); in one case, California’s agricultural interests 
circumvented international efforts to ban the use of methyl 
bromide, an ozone- depleting substance (Gareau 2008).
Panel 1. Blurring stakeholder boundaries in the Baltimore Urban Stewardship Network
As network governance becomes more common, scientists, 
practitioners, and policy makers can benefit from understanding 
the different roles that stakeholders play in the network, but 
accurate social network analysis requires that researchers 
explicitly define “stakeholder”. Although it is possible to analyze 
relationships between, for example, individuals and organizations, 
it becomes much more challenging when an identified group of 
individuals is embedded within an organization or an identified 
organization is embedded within another network. It is often left 
to the researcher to determine how to place stakeholders into 
discrete categories, even though the distinction is not always 
clear.
Such was the case in a study of environmental stewardship 
organizations in Baltimore, Maryland (Figure 1), conducted by 
MR (one of the authors of this paper). The intent was to inven-
tory and survey Baltimore’s stewardship organizations, and then 
analyze the resulting data to better understand network roles 
and relationships. Stewardship organizations could be any combi-
nation of non- profit, state, and private- sector stakeholders work-
ing to conduct a wide variety of stewardship activities in their 
local neighborhoods and surrounding areas. Both in the inven-
tory and survey analysis stages, we were faced with the question: 
what defines an organization? For instance, the City of Baltimore’s 
Office of Sustainability, Recreation and Parks Department, and 
Department of Public Works all conduct stewardship activities 
and have independent relationships with other stewardship 
organizations, yet they are also key agencies of the city, which 
many survey respondents identified as a partner. Another stake-
holder identified by survey respondents was the Community 
Greening Resource Network (CGRN), a member- based net-
work led by the Parks & People Foundation (www.parksandpeo-
ple.org). The CGRN is not a stand- alone organization but rather 
a network facilitated by staff and members to provide informa-
tion and tools for stewardship organizations. Including CGRN as 
a stakeholder in the network more accurately depicted how 
stewardship organizations view their relationships within the 
network but at the same time blurred the lines of defining an 
organization because CGRN is part of the Parks & People 
Foundation, and many of the stewardship organizations are mem-
bers of CGRN.
Figure 1. Duncan Street Miracle Garden in Baltimore, 
Maryland.
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Many network governance initiatives are driven by 
investments from charitable organizations. Numerous 
philanthropic efforts have undergone a shift in their own 
underlying logic to “link up to scale up” the impact of 
their investments (Kania and Kramer 2011). This has led 
many philanthropic foundations to fund the efforts of 
networks, even with the challenges present in measuring 
the impacts and outcomes of those efforts (see Bixler 
et al. 2016). However, this also creates situations 
where  networks are vulnerable to philanthropic capture. 
Philanthropic capture explains the ways that the funders 
of networks and network governance initiatives can 
shape the agendas and set the objectives of the networks 
(Himmelstein 1997), often overriding the goals of the 
network members.
 J Blurred boundaries
Boundaries appear prominently in discussions of network 
governance. As a management strategy, network gov-
ernance is valued for its ability to operate across eco-
logical, jurisdictional, and political boundaries (Scarlett 
and McKinney 2016). Although social and political 
boundaries in environmental governance have been 
addressed to some degree (Sternlieb et al. 2013), the 
blurring of stakeholder boundaries in network governance 
is a major challenge that remains largely underexplored. 
Stakeholders – who were once distinguished between 
those who affect and those who are affected by a de-
cision or action (Freeman 1984), or more simply between 
“polluter” and “victim” (Coase 1960) – now represent 
broad and various positions on an issue. The blurring 
of boundaries is illustrated by the debate over renewable 
energy development; as low- carbon wind energy pro-
duction is balanced against other environmental values 
(eg aesthetics, noise pollution, avian and bat conser-
vation), novel network configurations have emerged. 
In some places, networks of carbon energy industrialists, 
environmentalists, and grassroots activists have joined 
forces (Pasqualetti 2011); elsewhere, however, such net-
works have produced pro- wind and anti- environmental 
emergent stakeholders (Jepson et al. 2012).
The shifting and often ambiguous boundaries of stake-
holders pose a challenge to network governance initia-
tives (for an example of this challenge in an urban 
environmental stewardship network, see Panel 1). 
Positions, both within the actual structure of the network 
as well as value positions on an issue, are often hard to 
identify, and individual members are part of overlapping 
and sometimes conflicting networks.
In part, this blurring of boundaries is driven by ease of 
information sharing supported by internet technologies and 
social media, which enable multiple and diverse communi-
ties of interest to become networked, and to readily acquire 
and exchange knowledge relevant to their concerns. This 
ease of information sharing has also increased engagement 
in environmental decision making and politics. For exam-
ple, the effect of being connected through social media has 
recently been documented as a conservation stakeholder- 
building strategy (Kreakie et al. 2015) and – for example 
through the use of Twitter – as a science communication 
tool (Bombaci et al. 2015). Some have even asserted that 
Panel 2. Competing claims to aquifer knowledge in Texas
Working across boundaries is both a benefit and challenge in 
network governance. In the central Texas Hill Country, as it is 
locally known, a considerable degree of climate variability is 
driving patterns of extended drought that, along with rapid 
population growth and land fragmentation, are imperiling 
freshwater resources (Banner et al. 2010). In the region, 
governance is further complicated by access and allocation 
issues associated with how best to meet the water demands of 
urban populations, new residential developments, agriculture, 
and minimum environmental flows. Competing networks of 
organizations, agencies, land developers, and rural water users 
have emerged to govern water resources, although this conflict 
is affiliated with competing knowledge claims. At stake is the 
future of water allocation and distribution from overlapping 
aquifer and surface water systems. Although private- sector 
hydrological modeling studies indicate negligible drawdown of 
aquifer levels with increased pumping (in many cases to move 
water from rural to metropolitan areas), other investigations 
not only contradict these findings but also report negative 
impacts on surface- water flows (Figure 2). These competing 
technical claims, in combination with a fragmented policy and 
governance framework (Wagner and Kreuter 2004), have 
resulted in a network of governance that is vulnerable to 
capture by corporate interests promoting “water sustainability”, 
given the underlying scientific uncertainty as to what constitutes 
sustainable water use.
Figure 2. Medina River in the Texas Hill Country. Drought 
conditions and reduced groundwater levels decrease river 
flows.
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interactions between distant places and people are rapidly 
becoming so pervasive and influential that a new social–
ecological sustainability paradigm based on telecoupling 
(referring to socioeconomic and environmental interac-
tions over long distances) is needed (Liu et al. 2013).
Although facilitating network governance, internet 
technologies and social media that build and maintain 
connections also blur stakeholder boundaries through 
competing claims to technical expertise. Contemporary envi-
ronmental politics are driven by the inherent tensions 
over the benefits of democratic knowledge on the one 
hand and the ongoing disputes concerning scientific 
expertise on the other (Fischer 2000). Networks of com-
peting interests consistently counter and challenge the 
legitimacy of science- based information concerning, for 
instance, air and water quality, water availability, the 
evidence for climate change, and the impacts of extrac-
tive industries on ecosystem health. This is particularly 
acute in contexts of scientific uncertainties (Sarewitz 
2004). Panel 2 shows how competing claims to technical 
expertise with regard to aquifer levels and recharge rates 
in central Texas affect governance.
In southern Florida, decreasing phosphorus levels to 10 
parts per billion (ppb) in waters flowing from agricultural 
areas into the Everglades remains one of the central and 
most- litigated targets for achieving Everglades restora-
tion. Yet many farmers throughout the agricultural areas 
affecting the Everglades found these water- quality stand-
ards to be “unreasonable”, asserting that 10 ppb is “lower 
than the levels in rainfall or in bottled drinking water” 
(Cattelino in press). Academic and agency scientists 
have consistently argued against this claim, but scientific 
authority has become delegitimized in the highly conten-
tious anti- agricultural politics of Everglades restoration. 
Conflicts such as these can be particularly difficult for 
agency partners, who are often responsible for providing 
environmental expertise, to respond effectively.
Today, new information technologies and practices 
enable different forms of political engagement. As envi-
ronmental concerns become increasingly politicized, new 
“environmental subjects” emerge. These new environ-
mental subjects are individuals and groups that believe 
they too have a stake in environmental decision making. 
In some cases, new environmental subjects (also termed 
“emergent stakeholders”) emerge directly from the gov-
ernance process and may ultimately transform environ-
mental stewardship efforts. Research in the Everglades 
demonstrates that transformation from a cultural to polit-
ical identity reflects the ways in which network activism 
can shape network governance initiatives (Panel 3).
Network governance initiatives in fisheries management 
illustrate the rise of emergent stakeholders and the 
consequent challenge of capture. For example, at present, 
many people believe that they have a stake in fisheries 
management, thanks to increased media reach and 
advocacy group attention to declining fish populations 
worldwide (Gibbs 2007). The exponential rise in the 
number of stakeholders currently involved in fisheries 
management efforts has almost displaced centralized 
management regimes. Gibbs (2007) highlighted the 
Panel 3. Gladesmen: new environmental subjects
Over a decade ago, LAO (one of the authors of this paper) used 
the term “gladesmen” to describe the white rural hunting culture 
prevalent in Florida’s Everglades (Figure 3; Simmons and Ogden 
1998). At the time, the term was not commonly used by scholars 
or by local communities, although LAO felt the term evoked the 
centrality of the Everglades to local livelihood strategies and cul-
tural identity (Ogden 2011). Since then, the term has become 
ubiquitous, and today there are scores of “gladesmen” webpages, 
Facebook pages, blogs, and recreational events.
Notably, the term has also become “politically charged”, as local 
hunting and recreational groups now use it to assert their rights 
not only to the landscape and but also to inclusion within the 
decision- making process. This transformation from a cultural to a 
political identity reflects the ways that network activism can 
shape network governance initiatives. Restoration initiatives in 
the Everglades include many features common to network gov-
ernance approaches, including the spanning of multiple political 
and legal jurisdictional boundaries. Since the early years of resto-
ration planning, several collaborative decision- making organiza-
tions have helped shape Everglades restoration planning and pro-
grams (Ogden 2008). These organizations have primarily included 
groups considered to have a “stake” in restoration outcomes, 
such as government agencies, farming and real estate interests, 
and environmental non- governmental organizations, but glades-
men and their affiliated organizations were typically excluded 
from these early restoration- planning efforts. More recently, 
gladesmen have adopted and used network- activism strategies to 
compel lead agencies, such as the US Army Corps of Engineers, to 
consider their heritage and rights when evaluating the impacts of 
restoration projects.
Figure 3. Glen Simmons, foreground, pushing a traditional 
Everglades skiff.
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importance of “virtual institutions” in both the production 
of new environmental subjects and their influence on 
fisheries management, a trend exemplified by the pivotal 
role and global reach of the Marine Stewardship Council, 
a fisheries certification organization, on fisheries practices, 
communities, and management. Occasionally network 
governance initiatives enable new environmental subjects 
to undermine the interests of groups with long- term 
cultural and economic ties to a landscape – in the case of 
fisheries, recreational anglers have become powerful 
participants in network governance efforts and often 
displace the rights of traditional and commercial fishers 
(Gibbs 2007). Emergent stakeholders are a part of network 
governance, as well as contemporary politics, but at the 
same time their participation may complicate stewardship 
initiatives.
 J Conclusion
The benefits of network governance over traditional 
models of environmental decision making outweigh the 
challenges we describe here. As other contributors to 
this Special Issue argue, network governance enables 
multiple forms of environmental and organizational 
leadership (Imperial et al. 2016); provides a framework 
for considering relationships between multiple levels 
of governance, cross- scale linkages, and collaboration 
across multiple and overlapping but separate issues 
(Bixler et al. 2016); and generally offers a workable 
environmental management alternative to challenges 
of contemporary environmental governance (Scarlett 
and McKinney 2016). A focus on network governance 
implies that the managing process is less formalized 
and focused on adaptability, with implications on how 
environmental management institutions should be de-
signed (Bodin et al. 2006). Through appropriate design 
of network governance initiatives, vulnerability to net-
work capture can be acknowledged and addressed by 
matching the process of governance to the particular 
issue or opportunity. Risk of capture can be mitigated 
if a one- size- fits- all approach is avoided and stakeholders 
engage in the process of developing the governance 
system.
Despite its tendency to lead to network capture, net-
work fluidity remains one of the strengths of network 
governance. Mirroring transformations within political 
and social movement approaches over the past several 
decades, network governance is characterized by decen-
tralized decision making and the rapid sharing of infor-
mation. As environmental justice advocates have noted, 
traditional planning approaches tend to exclude entire 
segments of the general public, particularly minority and/
or economically disadvantaged groups, from the decision- 
making process (Forester 1989). These excluded groups 
typically endure a disproportionately large share of the 
negative consequences associated with the implementa-
tion of environmental planning and policy decisions 
(Cole and Foster 2001). The flexible nature of network 
governance is appealing for many grassroots environmen-
tal activists who have felt excluded from mainstream 
environmental organizations and traditional governmen-
tal processes of decision making, because it offers them “a 
voice at the table” and thus a means of providing input 
(Schlosberg 1999).
As network governance initiatives continue to expand 
and receive greater attention, the challenges of capture in 
the ways we outline in this paper need to be carefully con-
sidered. As Davies (2012) warned, we must carefully con-
sider “the nature of efficacy of networking in contemporary 
political economy”. The challenges of capture serve to 
underscore the limitations in both theory and practice of 
network governance, and we should continue to amelio-
rate these challenges to enhance governance outcomes.
 J References
Aycrigg JL, Davidson A, Svancara LK, et al. 2013. Representation 
of ecological systems within the protected areas network of the 
continental United States. PLoS ONE 8: e54689.
Banner JL, Jackson CS, Yang Z-L, et al. 2010. Climate change 
impacts on Texas water: a white paper assessment of the past, 
present, and future recommendations for action. Texas Water J 
1: 1–19.
Belsky JM. 1999. Misrepresenting communities: the politics of 
community- based rural ecotourism in Gales Point Manatee, 
Belize. Rural Sociol 64: 641–66.
Bixler RP, Johnson S, Emerson K, et al. 2016. Networks and 
 landscapes: a framework for setting goals and evaluating 
 performance at the large landscape scale. Front Ecol Environ 
14: 145–53.
Bodin Ö, Crona B, and Ernstson H. 2006. Social networks in natu-
ral resource management: what is there to learn from a struc-
tural perspective? Ecol Soc 11: r2.
Bombaci SP, Farr CM, Gallo T, et al. 2015. Using Twitter to com-
municate conservation science from a professional conference. 
Conserv Biol 30: 216–25.
Briggs S. 2003. Command and control in natural resource manage-
ment: revisiting Holling and Meffe. Ecol Manage Restor 4: 
161–62.
Cashore B. 2003. Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental 
governance: how non- state market- driven (NSMD) governance 
systems gain rule- making authority. Governance 15: 503–29.
Cashore B, Auld G, and Nesom D. 2004. Governing through mar-
kets: forest certification and the emergence of non-state 
authority. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Castree N. 2010. Neoliberalism and the biophysical environment: 
a synthesis and evaluation of the research. Environ Soc Adv Res 
1: 5–45.
Cattelino J. Unsettling nature: an Everglades ethnography. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. In press.
Clarke JN and McCool D. 1996. Staking out the terrain: power and 
performance among natural resource agencies. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press.
Coase RH. 1960. The problem of social cost. J Law Econ 3: 1–44.
Cole LW and Foster S. 2001. From the ground up: environmental 
racism and the rise of the environmental justice movement. 
New York, NY: New York University Press.
Culhane J. 1981. Public lands politics: interest group influence on 
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Davidson DJ and Frickel S. 2004. Understanding environmental 
governance: a critical review. Organ Environ 17: 471–92.
171
RP Bixler et al. Network governance for large-scale conservation
© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org
Davies JS. 2012. Network governance theory: a Gramscian cri-
tique. Environ Plann A 44: 2687–704.
Decker DJ, Krueger CC, Baer JRA, et al. 1996. From clients to 
stakeholders: a philosophical shift for fish and wildlife manage-
ment. Hum Dimens Wildl 1: 70–82.
Deleuze G and Guattari F. 1987. A thousand plateaus: capitalism 
and schizophrenia. Massumi B (Translator). Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Fischer F. 2000. Citizens, experts, and the environment: the poli-
tics of local knowledge. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Fletcher R. 2010. Neoliberal environmentality: towards a post-
structuralist political ecology of the conservation debate. 
Conserv Soc 8: 171–81.
Forester J. 1989. Planning in the face of power. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Freeman RE. 1984. Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. 
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Gareau BJ. 2008. Dangerous holes in global environmental govern-
ance: the roles of neoliberal discourse, science, and California 
agriculture in the Montreal Protocol. Antipode 40: 102–30.
Gibbs MT. 2007. Network governance in fisheries. Mar. Policy 32: 
113–19.
Heynen N, McCarthy J, Prudham S, and Robbins P. 2007. 
Neoliberal environments: false promises and unnatural conse-
quences. New York, NY: Routledge.
Himmelstein J. 1997. Looking good and doing good: corporate 
philanthropy and corporate power. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press.
Holling CS and Meffe GK. 1996. Command and control and the pathol-
ogy of natural resource management. Conserv Biol 10: 328–37.
Igoe J and Brockington D. 2007. Neoliberal conservation: a brief 
introduction. Conserv Soc 5: 423–49.
Imperial MT, Ospina S, Johnston E, et al. 2016. Understanding 
leadership in a world of shared problems: advancing network 
governance in large landscape conservation. Front Ecol Environ 
14: 126–34.
Jedd T and Bixler RP. 2015. Accountability in networked govern-
ance: learning from a case of landscape- scale forest conserva-
tion. Environ Policy Gov 25: 172–87.
Jepson W, Brannstrom C, and Persons N. 2012. “We don’t take the 
pledge”: environmentality and environmental skepticism at the 
epicenter of US wind energy development. Geoforum 43: 851–63.
Kania J and Kramer M. 2011. Collective impact. Stanford Soc Innov 
Rev Winter: 36–41.
Kreakie BJ, Hychka KC, Belaire JA, et al. 2015. Internet- based 
approaches to building stakeholder networks for conservation 
and natural resource management. Environ Manage; 
doi:10.1007/s00267- 015- 0624- 8.
Lemos MC and Agrawal A. 2006. Environmental governance. 
Annu Rev Env Resour 31: 297–325.
Leong KM, Emmerson DP, and Byron R. 2011. The new govern-
ance era: implications for collaborative conservation and 
 adaptive management in Department of the Interior agencies. 
Hum Dimens Wildl 16: 236–43.
Liu JV, Hull M, Batistella R, et al. 2013. Framing sustainability in a 
telecoupled world. Ecol Soc 18: 26.
Locke H. 2011. Transboundary cooperation to achieve wilderness 
protection and large landscape conservation. PARKScience 28: 
24–28.
McCarthy J. 2006. Neoliberalism and the politics of alternatives: 
community forestry in British Columbia and the United States. 
Ann Assoc Am Geogr 96: 84–104.
Ogden L. 2008. The Everglades ecosystem and the politics of 
nature. Am Anthropol 110: 21–32.
Ogden L. 2011. Swamplife: people, gators, and mangroves entan-
gled in the Everglades. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Parrott L and Meyer WS. 2012. Future landscapes: managing 
within complexity. Front Ecol Environ 10: 382–89.
Pasqualetti MJ. 2011. Opposing wind energy landscapes: a search 
for common cause. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 101: 907–17.
Peters DP. 2008. Ecology in a connected world: a vision for a “net-
work of networks”. Front Ecol Environ 6: 227.
Romolini M. Adaptive governance for 21st century sustainable 
cities: comparing stewardship networks in Baltimore and 
Seattle (PhD dissertation). Burlington, VT: University of 
Vermont. Unpublished.
Sarewitz D. 2004. How science makes environmental controversies 
worse. Environ Sci Policy 7: 385–403.
Scarlett L and McKinney M. 2016. Connecting people and places: 
the emerging role of network governance in large landscape 
conservation. Front Ecol Environ 14: 116–25.
Schlosberg D. 1999. Networks and mobile arrangements: organiza-
tional innovation in the US environmental justice movement. 
Environ Polit 8: 122–48.
Shepard J. 1975. The forest killers. New York, NY: Weybright and 
Talley.
Simmons G and Ogden L. 1998. Gladesmen: gator hunters, moon-
shiners, and skiffers. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
Smith CA. 2011. The role of state wildlife professionals under the 
public trust doctrine. J Wildlife Manage 75: 1539–43.
Sternlieb F, Bixler RP, Huber-Sterns H, and Huaska C. 2013. 
A question of fit: reflections on boundaries, organizations, 
and social–ecological systems. J Environ Manage 130: 117–25.
Taylor P. 2005. In the market but not of it: Fair Trade coffee and 
Forest Stewardship Council certification as market- based social 
change. World Dev 33: 129–47.
Wagner MW and Kreuter UP. 2004. Groundwater supply in Texas: 
private land considerations in a rule- of- capture state. Soc Natur 
Resour 17: 349–57.
Wyborn C and Bixler RP. 2013. Collaboration and nested environ-
mental governance: scale dependency, scale framing, and cross- 
scale interactions in collaborative conservation. J Environ 
Manage 123: 58–67.
